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ARTHUR B. LAFFER •University of Chicago
INTHEIR flOW classic article, Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant [2]
set forth a novel framework for analyzing the balance of payments of
the United States. If correct, their analysis, which is referred to as the
hypothesis of International Financial Intermediation (IFI), leads to the
following conclusions: (a) Persistent deficits, within some limits, may
not be an indication of a disequilibrium position in the sense that the
dollar is overvalued relative to other currencies. Instead, these deficits
may actually be necessary for a healthy world economy. (b)Lackof
confidence in the dollar is brought about by a failure to understand the
international role of the dollar. (c)Unlesscontrols are exceptionally
pervasive, the normal tools of macroeconomic policy are likely to fail
in controlling the deficit. A fourth point derived from the Despres-
Kindleberger-Salant analysis is that most interpretations of the deficit
of the United States incorrectly emphasize a need for additional
external liquidity, when instead, the private capital market can, and
should, provide this external liquidity in addition to internal liquidity.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, a formal model will be
developed that is consistent with my conception of the IFI hypothesis.
The model will be formalized in such a manner that its implications
can be systematically derived. Secondly, the hypothesis itself will be
tested with quarterly data covering ten years of balance-of-payments
experience of the United States.
In general, one can visualize equilibrium analyses of the balance
of payments in three broad classes of models. The first class, which is
NOTE:Comments and discussions with R. Coates. E. Fama. and R. Mundell proved
very helpful to me. I also want to thank R. Cocks and R. Winterfor helpingin the sta-
tistical work.
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currentlyaccepted orthodoxy, assumes that, both conceptually and
empirically, the monetary movements, i.e., approximately the below-
the-line account of the "official settlements" balance, is the residual.
The second class of models assumes that the bond market, i.e., an
approximate equivalent to the capital accounts of the balance of pay-
ments, is the residual. The IFI hypothesis fits into this second class of
models. The third class which, to my knowledge, has never been seri-
ously advanced, assumes that the residual is the current account of the
balance of payments. Naturally, in a fully specified complete system, it
should make little difference which account is the residual. (In the
traditional literature on the balance of payments, the residual account is
often referred to' as being induced.) Given the progress of general-
equilibrium theory to date, such consistency among the three broad
categories does not exist. In general, the empirical results tend not to
reject the IFI hypothesis. It is, however, impossible with our data to
distinguish this hypothesis from one that postulates a world in which
the 'bond market is the residual.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that any attempt to formalize
the IFI hypothesis must discard many of the caveats and qualifications
which appeared in the original article. This simplification is not done to
ridicule the model or to expose it to the maximum risk of rejection.
The purpose is merely to present the essential features of the model in
as simple a manner as possible. One major strand of the Despres-
Kindleberger-Salant paper is omitted entirely from the present analysis
—the trade in longer-term financial assets. Although admittedly im-
portant from many points of view, trade in such financial assets does
not materially affect the over-all balance-of-payments figures.In
addition, from an empirical viewpoint, data on gross long-term flows
would be difficult to obtain.
1INTERNATIONALFINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION:
INTERPRETATION
THE WI hypothesis begins by postulating a demand for money on the
part of private sectors in the individual countries. In general, threer
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argumentsenter this demand function: the over-all price level, real
income, and a price term for money. Both the over-all price level and
real income affect the demand for money positively and with roughly
the same magnitude. The demand for money, however, is negatively
related to the price term for money. Thus, the higher the price of
money, the lower the demand. The "price of money" should be thought
of as an interest rate which includes implicit price factors—the avail-
ability of money and so on.' Let us describe country i's demand




andwhere L, is the demand for nominal money on the part of country
1; k is the nominal income coefficient of the demand for money—as-
sumed to be the same for all countries; and Y is the level of real in-
come prevailing in country 1. P is the world's price level—assumed to
be the same in all countries. The interest-rate coefficient of the de-
mand for money in country i iswhere= and where sV1is
assumed to be constant. Finally, r is the world's interest rate—as-
sumed to be the same in all countries.2
Starting from equation (1), country i's demand function for
money, the amount of additional nominal money demanded between
two points in time, L1,bycountry I is as follows:
=kP)'1 + ++ r11, (2)
wherea dot over a variable represents the change in that variable over
the time period. Thus, the increase in the demand for money depends
crucially upon the change in the level of real income, the change in the
IForseveral reasons an interest rate is not the price of money. In the first place,
money often has an explicit yield in the form of lower service charges or preferential
borrowing rates. Secondly, holding short-term bonds is only one alternative to holding
money, and for this reason, some average of the price of money in terms of other alter.
natives must also be included in its price. Finally, the rate of interest refers only to the
price one must pay to hold money for one period, whereas the price of money includes
its price in perpetuity.
2See[2, p. 47].
interaction term, isassumed to be so small that it can be neglected without
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world's price level, and the change in the level of the world's price
term for money.
At this stage of the development of the model, we can bring in
the unique aspects of the IF! hypothesis. According to Despres,
Kindleberger, and Salant, "Banks and other financial intermediaries,
unlike traders, are paid to give up liquidity. The United States is no
more in deficit when it lends long and borrows short than is a bank
when it makes a loan and enters a deposit on its books" [2, p. 44].
Thus, the unique role of the United States is that of major supplier of
money to the rest of the world. In an extreme form, in order to simplify
the analysis without loss of generality, we can consider the United
States as the sole supplier of money to the world. Thus, from one
equilibrium position to the next, the increase in the world's supply of
money, MS. originates in the United States. In order to maintain
equilibrium, the world's increase in the demand for money must equal
the world's increase in the supply of money. Thus,
(3)
Substituting equation (2) into equation (3) and transposing terms,
we obtain the following relationship:
tv/S= + ++ (4)
We are now able to solve for the change in the equilibrium of the




Asstated earlier, If Y, equalswhereis a constant for each
country i, and therefore I, = Substituting again, we obtain the





Growthinreal output, Y1,andthe proportional interest-rate coefficient of the de-
mand formoney, u,are assumedto beindependent such thatiu',Y,=INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION• 665
Here the absolute change in the equilibrium price level is func-
tionally related to the increase in the money supply of the United
States, the real rate of growth of the world economy, and the change
in the world's price term for money. Equation (6) represents the
equilibrium change in the price level of the world. We are now able to
go back to the increase in the demand for money by each country 1,
because we have ensured the completeness of the system insofar as the
increase in the supply of money is equal to the increase in the demand
for money. Hence from equations (2) and (6) we obtain
=kPY1+ rl1 +kY, — p
—
(7)
Cancelling terms, we obtain the following:
=p,MS+ (kP + rIv1)(Y1 —gY1)+ (w, — (8)
where p. = Y1.
This then represents the equilibrium increase in money—both de-
mand and supply—for each and every country i.
Now, for any country i other than the United States, insofar as we
have assumed that all the increase in the supply of money comes about
via the monetary authorities of the United States, the increase in
money must reveal itself in the balance of payments.6 Thus the in-
crease in the stock of money is equal to the over-all surplus in the
balance of payments or, in other words, exports less imports plus net
capital inflows. Hence,
L,=x1—M,+ K,, (9)
whereis country i's export of goods and services, M, is country i's
import of goods and services, and K is this country's net international
capital inflow. Transposing the terms, we obtain an expression for
country i's net capital inflows:
K, =—(X1—Al,)+ L1, (10)
and substituting equation (8) into equation (10) we get
Thisassumes that rg is sufficiently small so that it can safely be ignored.
B Credit creation is ignored in this paper but may, in fact, be very important. A good
analysis of credit creation can be found in Mundell {5].
pI
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K, =—(Xi—M.)+ (kP + rw,)(Y— YR)+ pMS + — (11)
For the United States, the financial intermediary nation, the in-
crease in domestically held money does not come solely from balance-
of-payments surpluses. Being the intermediary nation, the United
States is the world's producer of money and, therefore, the increase in
domestically held money equals the amount of domestically produced
money less the over-all payments deficit. Hence,
= — + + MS. (9')
Solving for net capital inflows into the United States, we get
= — + —S. (10')
Substituting equation (8) into equation (10') and combining terms,
we obtain
KLs =—(XL.s—MLs)—(1—
+ (kP + — + —if;).(11')
With this formulation for net capital inflows into the United
States, we have most of the essence of the IFI hypothesis. Despres,
Kindleberger, and Salant argue that, unless pushed to extremes, the
change in the interest-rate coefficient, —is,in fact, very small.
This can be seen from their statement that "an attempt to halt the
capital outflow by raising rates in the United States either would have
little effect over any prolonged period or else would cripple European
growth" [2, pp. 46—47]. Needless to say, the size of WLS —is an
empirical question.
From the equation determining the capital flows we can also un-
derstand how the authors can conclude:
With capital markets unrestricted, attempts to correct the "de-
ficit" by ordinary macro-economic weapons are likely to fail. It
may be possible to expand the current account surplus at first by
deflation of United States income and prices relative to those of
Europe; but gross financial capital flows will still exceed real
transfers of goods and services so long as capital formation re-
mains high in Europe [2, p. 43].INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION• 667
This is most easily seen if we solve for the over-all balance of pay-
ments of the United States. Analytically this is nothing more than
adding exports and subtracting imports from the net-capital-inflow
equation—equation (11'). This is shown as equation (12):
BLS =(l—PLS)MS+ (kP+rwus)(Yus— + — (12)
where isthe over-all balance of payments of the United States.
From this relationship, the current account does not enter into the
determination of the over-all balance of payments. In fact, any increase
or decrease in the current-account surplus of the United States will be
matched pan passu by an increase or decrease in the deficit on capital
account. Furthermore, the only factors that will affect the over-all
balance of payments of the United States are the absolute increase in
the supply of money in the United States, the relative rate of income
growth between the United States and Europe (or—in the authors' own
phrase—"capital formation"), and finally, the diminutive effect (ac-
cording to Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant) of changes in the price
term for money. In one sense, the authors err when they imply that
monetary policy, one of the "ordinary macro-economic weapons," will
not succeed. This, however, may be explained by their implicit assump-
tion (found also in their description of the goods market) that Europe is
a "small country," i.e., Pus= 1.In this sense, 1—pus would equal
zero.
So far we have implicitly been referring to the liquidity definition
of the United States balance of payments and its implied definition of
net capital inflows as excluding increases in American liquid liabilities
to foreigners. When we move to the official-settlements definition of the
balance of payments —whichappears to be far preferable —wehave to
include an analysis of changes in American liquid liabilities to private
foreigners. Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant [2, p. 49] argue that
foreigners, in general, will wish to accumulate liquid dollar assets for
dollar-transactions purposes and possibly as compensating balances for
dollar debts. Thus, net private capital inflows into the United States
additionally will be a function of changes in the level of foreign dollar
transactions, iXXSA.Addingthis to the net-capital-inflows equation
(11'), we obtain the following over-all equation for private and net
capital flows of the United States:"1
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= — —(1— + (kP+rwus)(Yus —
+ —+ (13)
where a > 0.
Equation (13), with a minor adaptation, is the equation which will
be used to test the IFI hypothesis in the next section.
2INTERNATIONALFINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION:
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
IN THE first section of this paper, I formally developed the equation for
the equilibrium net capital inflow of the international financial inter-
mediary, the United States. In this section, I plan to test that model as
simply and as thoroughly as the existing data and theory permit. In
general, my results support this version of the IFI hypothesis although
they do not enable one to distinguish the IF! hypothesis from models
such as those found in the work of Mundell [6] or Laffer [4].
The data (see the Appendix) are on a quarterly basis and go from
the first quarter of 1958 through the last quarter of 1967. Thus, there
are forty observations of the balance-of-payments data for the United 4
Statesand of other variables.
Prior to the actual testing of the model, I want to make one modest
adjustment. The average rate of growth in the world, g, can be decom-
posed into two separate factors: the growth rates of the United States
and the rest of the world. Thus, — becomes (I —Pus)Yus
PUsYF. The equation for the net capital inflow of the United States now
reads as follows:
= — — (1— —(kP+
+ (kP+rwus)(l— Pus)Yus+ Yusr(wus —+ (14)
The empirical counterparts to the above theoretical variables are
as follows:
7The actualdata and their sourcesare in the Appendix.
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isthe net private capital flow of the United States
(bothforeign and domestic) plus errors and omis-
sions;
XL'S— ML'Sisthe total current-account balance of the United
States;
MS isthechange inthemoney supply of the United
States;
is the change in a weighted average of foreign indus-
trial production indices;
isthe change in the industrial production index of the
United States;
is the monthly change in the seasonally adjusted
monthly exports of the United States; and
YLSristhe change in velocity—the industrial production
index of the United States divided by the money
supply—standardized by the level of the industrial
production index.8
The results of the first regression are as follows:
K=—39.7—l.04(X—M)—




After eliminating the statistically insignificant variable from the
regression we obtain 10
Ourtheory to date deals with the world's price term for money, which should repre-
sent some composite average of alternative assets' nominal yields less the nominal
yield on money itself, Estimation of either the composite average or the nominal yield on
money is subject to sufficient error virtually to guarantee spurious results. We, therefore,
went directly to a measure of velocity, which is the variable the price of money should,
in fact, affect,
numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are the (-tests, e.g., the coefficients
divided by their respective standard errors,
'°Puttingthis equation in its balance-of-payments form (e.g., K— X+ M),aswas done
in Laffer [4], has virtually no effect on either the coefficients or their 1-tests. The
R2 and F are .293 and 3.63, respectively.'1
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K30.3—l.04(XM)— cr




k2=724 F17.8SEE= 418DW= 1.80
Increases and decreases in foreign income are found not to have a
C
statistically significant effect on net capital inflows of the United a
States. This is the lone piece of evidence that mars the otherwise con-
firming results for this version of the IFI hypothesis.
The IFI hypothesis postulates that the partial derivative of the net
a
private capital movements with respect to the current account should,
in fact, be minus one. The net regression coefficient was —1 .04, which
is less than one-half of one standard error away from minus one. The
change in the money-supply variable presents the strongest evidence
g
in support of this version of the IF! hypothesis, even though it is
tacitly rejected by the authors of the IFI hypothesis. An increase in
19
themoney supply of the United States of one billion dollars during a
quarter is associated with an additional net capital outflow of 425 mil-
lion dollars.'1 This relationship (425: 1000) approximates the propor-
tion of world income earned by countries with convertible currencies
other than the United States, 1 — If the United States were not a
producer of the international money, we should expect to find a posi-
tive relationship between net capital inflows and changes in the money
supply. To the extent that the United States is not the sole producer of
money in the world, the coefficient of the change in the money-supply
variable is biased upward, i.e., the true coefficient should be more
negative.
Increases in the industrial production index of the United States
also fit neatly into this version of the IFI hypothesis. When the index
is converted to roughly equivalent GNP terms, this relationship be-
tween the industrial production index and the balance of payments can
be interpreted as stating that a one billion dollar increase in GNP will
lead to a net inflow of approximately one hundred million dollars,
'tin terms of proportions, this would be roughly 30 per cent.
'2iohn Exter of First National City Bank has been perhaps the major proponent of
this view.INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION•671
ceteris paribus. This coefficient is almost identical with the coefficient
found in Laffer [4]. It also strikes at the very heart of traditional policy
and theory, insofar as an increase in domestic income improves the
country's balance of payments. Also, in the earlier study it was found
that an increase in domestic income causes a deterioration in the cur-
rent account and an improvement in the capital account that more than
compensates for the deterioration of the current account. These results
are found here too.
Changes in the seasonally adjusted level of exports from the
United States—changes in the level of foreign dollar transactions—
are also found to be empirically relevant. Their relationship to net
capital inflows approximates what might be expected. Foreigners
hold approximately one-half a quarter's transactions in dollar balances.
Naturally, increases in foreign dollar transactions are, on the average,
greater than increases in American exports; but, similarly, increases in
foreign dollar balances are, on the average, greater than the increases
in their deposits in the United States.
The final variable, is also statistically significant. The princi-
pal policy conclusion coming from this variable, as Despres, Kindle-
berger, and Salant state, is that one cannot really hope to use interest-
rate policy as a tool for correcting the balance of payments.
All in all, it does not appear that this version of the IFI hypothesis
is to be rejected as statistically insignificant, or as unimportant. The
actual data and the theory mesh quite nicely, even without any lags.
To summarize, itis somewhat overwhelming, even to a fervent
adherent of the classical theory of balance-of-payments adjustment, to
see just how closely the hypothesis fits the actual data on a quarterly
basis. During the period from the first quarter of 1958 through the
fourth quarter of 1967, many environmental factors changed sub-
stantially, and these changes could conceivably have had a major in-
fluence on the balance of payments of the United States. Yet, one can
scarcely find a ripple of their transitory effects, let alone any lasting
These results were obtained without an intricate and complex
econometric or theoretical structure. The model assumes that adjust-
ment is instantaneous and that coefficients are linear as well as identi-
cal across nations, and it includes a mere handful of variables. None-
"SeeCooper[I] and Laffer 131.672 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL A
theless, the hypothesis it represents appears to be relevant from an jr
empiricalpoint of view.
The conclusions from a classical analysis of the balance of pay-
ments warrant far more attention than they have been getting. Deficits
need not imply disequilibrium in any meaningful sense of the word, and
there is no evidence that they do. Lack of confidence in the dollar
5
does,perhaps, represent a misunderstanding of the world economy and
not any true weakness of the dollar. Policy, unless extreme, appears to 5
have had little, if any, effect on the balance of payments. Finally, sup-
plying external as well as internal liquidity is well within the powers
of a private capital market.APPENDIX: THE DATA
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I.
KL,s X —M MS 't's Yp Yusr
Date (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
58-1 —232 107 —6.50 —532 —4.5 —.4 .347
58-11 —934 89 1.90 57 3.8 —.4 —3.897
58-ILl 175 —325 2.10 32 3.9 1.1 —3.684
58-tV —243 63 7.10 —46 4.2 1.0 1.031
59-1 546 —559 —4.80 —142 4.4 3.1 —11.200
59-Il 600 —697 .60 32 5.1 2.7 —6.276
59-111 878 —825 .80 438 —5.9 3.2 8.418
59-IV —144 —171 2.90 —3 5.5 5.6 —4.647
60-1 31 41 —5.90 382 1.0 —1.3 —7.230
60-11 —77 292 —1.10 258 —.9 4.5 .038
60-111 —609 14 1.90 198 —1.8 .9 4.176
60-tV —1998 1260 4.20 22 —4.2 2.1 9.674
61-1 —958 971 —3.90 139 .2 1.6 —4.179
61-11 —845 746 .50 —250 7.1 2.1 —9.131
61-111 600 79 1.80 285 1.1 1.1 .398
61-IV —1358 1080 6.30 187 3.6 3.2 1.700
62-1 —491 462 —4.60 —76 1.4 .7 —6.409
62-11 —256 866 —.40 435 1.6 .9 —2.380
62-Ill —948 41 .60 —40 1.2 2.5 —.861
62-tV—1030 918 6.60 —75 —.7 —.2 7.447
63-1 —241 670 —4.00 —62 2.2 1.0 —6.800
63-11 —351 953 .70 567 4.2 4.7 —4.411
63-Ill —64 —110 2.30 58 —.1 2.8 2.418
63-tV —1082 1490 6.70 397 1.4 4.1 5.019
64-1 —1382 1700 —4.40 554 2.2 4.1 —7.129
64-Il —1166 1330 .50 —96 2.6 .3 —2.582
64-Ill —330 653 3.70 338 2.4 1.7 .902
64-IV —1239 1940 6.90 186 4.1 3.3 2.093
65-1 —1583 1080 —5.10 —765 2.6 1.3 —8.188
65-11 —818 1340 .60 1400 2.0 3.1 —1.659
65-Ill —64 249 3.60 —115 .8 1.8 2.706
65-IV —1260 1390 8.90 36 5.2 2.0 2.990
66-1 —945 825 —4.20 408 5.0 5.6 —9.983
66-11 —173 699 .80 117 2.8 .4 —2.257
66-111 668 —449 1.10 267 1.2 2.5 —.193
66-tV —739 1080 6.10 147 1.8 1.5 4.163
67-1 —1096 721 —3.90 312 —3.1 .4 —.483
67-Il 508 564 2.40 6 —.8 1.7 3.279
67-111 1313 —425 4.10 136 1.2 3.9 2.756
67-IV —63 831 8.80 —17 5.2 8.0 2.884674•INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
SOURCES:
Column 1. Net capital flows in millions of dollars is the sum of(a) "Trans-
actions in U.S. Private Assets (net)," line 32 of "U.S. International Transac-
tions," table I, page 31 of the Survey of Current Business, September, 1968;
(b) "Transactions in Foreign Assets in the U.S.," line 50 of the above table;
and (c) "Errors and Omissions," line 60 of the above table, and previous issues
of the Survey of Current Business.
Column 2. Current account in millions of dollars is the balance on goods,
services, and unilateral transfers (net), line 31 of "U.S. International Transac-
tions," table 1, page 31 of the Survey of Current Business, September, 1968,
and previous issues. This account may also be obtained by the summation of
the balance on goods and services, line 23, and unilateral transfers (net), line
25 of the above table.
Column 3. Money supply, defined as the total of demand deposits and cur-
rency, is from "Money Supply and Related Data," page A-l6 of the Federal
Reserve Bulletin, February, 1968, and previous issues. Quarterly changes
were calculated from "not seasonally adjusted" end-of-quarter figures. These
data are in billions of dollars.
Column 4. Seasonally adjusted exports of goods and services (excluding
transfers under military grants) in millions of dollars is line 2 of "U.S. Inter-
national Transactions—Seasonally Adjusted," table 2, page 32 of the Survey
of Current Business, September, 1968, and previous issues. Quarterly changes
were based on these end-of-quarter figures.
Column 5. Index of Industrial Production (U.S., 1957—59 =100)is from
the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Industrial Production S.A., February, 1968,
page A-52, and previous issues. Quarterly changes were based on these end-
of-quarter figures.
Column 6. Index of Industrial Production (Foreign, 1957—59 =100)is a
composite index with a weighting based on dollar GNP of the included coun-
tries for the period 1957—59. The data for the individual indices are from
Appendix Section C: "Historical Data for Selected Series," Business Condi-
lions Digest (previously Business Cycle Developments), Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, December, 1969. OECD, Europe, and Canada
are on page lOS; and Japan is on page 107. The composite index was calcu-
• lated on a quarterly basis and quarterly changes were derived from these
figures for ends of quarters.
• Column 7. Quarterly change in velocity, standardized for income, is
identical to the quarterly change in the ratio of Index of Industrial Produc-
tion (U.S.) to the level of money supply, multiplied by the Index of Industrial
Production. See above, paragraphs 3 and 5, for the sources.r
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The papers by Salant and Laffer on international financial inter- I WO
mediation (IFI) are of current interest. Balance-of-payments statis- the
tics reveal this country to have been in an almost continuous deficit
position for the past two decades. In the first partofthis period, the raise
deficits were welcomed by most economists, owing to the "dollar sens
shortage" in foreign countries. More recently, the deficits have been
viewed with great concern by most economists, owing to the "dollar effec
glut" abroad. and
The examination of IF! may well be the most important recent prob
development in the field of international economics. The examination woul
was first carried out by Kindleberger in his pioneering article of 1965.' In CO1
It was expanded and refined by Des pres, Kindleberger, and Salant in
their 1966 article.2 Since that time, there has been much discussion of of
IF!.3 In their papers, both Salant and Laffer continue this timely dis-
cussion. 9
Salant'spaper examines the IF! hypothesis, pointing out that mg p1
much of the criticism advanced against it is invalid. In addition, he intert1
argues that other parts of the criticism do not necessarily disprove this ciatiq
theorem.
Laffer, in his paper, seeks to formalize the hypothesis so that its IFI
implications can be systematically derived. In addition, he seeks to finanq
NOTE: I wasat the University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, when this materialwas pre- ture ç
pared. My thanks go to Benjamin Klein for many helpful discussions on the subject.
'Charles P. Kindleberger, "Balance-of.Payments Deficits and the International Mar- nato ket for Liquidity." Essays in International Finance, No. 46. Princeton, International
Finance Section, 1965.
'Emile Despres, Charles P. Kindleberger, Walter S. Salant, "The Dollar and World
'
Liquidity—A Minority View." Economist, February 5, 1966, Pp. 526—529. Reprinted
byThe Brookings Institution, Washington, April, 1966. "The
See, for example, Lawrence H. Officer and Thomas D. Willett, eds., The interna- Vol.
tional Monetary System. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969, Part II, The
Section A; and George N. HaIm, "International Financial Intermediation: Deficits econonil
Benign and Malignant." Essays in International Finance, No. 68. Princeton, Inter.
national Finance Section, 1968. smith flr
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test it. Laffer points out that his results tend to support the IFI hy-
pothesis, while not necessarily disproving alternative hypotheses.
• The inconclusive nature of the results of the empirical studies
would appear to be, in part at least, attributable to the imprecise nature
of what, in fact, the 1FI hypothesis is. From Section 2 of Salant's paper,
I would guess that what Salant has in mind are, among other things,
inter the possible explanations of why IFI occurs. An examination of
statiS Laffer's introductory comments on what the hypothesis points out also
e CI raises some question as to what it is. Each of the statements is in a
d, t e sense correct, but also in a sense incorrect, or at least, imprecise.
dollar , . .
b Salant s discussion of both what is entailed by IFI, and what its
dollar effects are, is very interesting and potentially very useful. if the nature
and effects of IFI could be clarified, empirical implications could
recent probably be more easily obtained. At that point, empirical studies
•ation would probably be more productive than they appear to be at present.
1965'
Incontrast to the 1966 article, the policy implications of Salant's paper
ant appear to be well stated. In the earlier article, the alleged compatibility
ion of of IFI with the existing international monetary system was unwar-
Idis- ranted.
IFI differs from domestic financial intermediation in the entity tak-
t that ing part in the intermediation: domestically, the entity is a financial
he intermediary institution—a commercial bank, a savings and loan asso-
'ethis ciation, a mutual savings bank, a credit union; internationally, it is the
United States as a whole. Thus, the United States may be engaged in
IFI with, or without, the participation of what we consider a domestic
its . . .
to financial intermediary institution.
- IFlalso differs from domestic financial intermediation in the na-
laspre- ture of the assets purchased and issued: domestically, the assets pur-
)jeet. chasedand issued are financial securities—equities or debt;' inter-
alMar- nationally,the assets may be real on one side of the transaction.5 Thus,
.ational
World See, for example, John G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw. tvlonevin a Theory ofFi,iance.
printed Washington. The Brookings Institution. 1960. pp. 94 and 192; and Joseph M. Burns,
"The Relative Decline of Commercial Banks: A Note." Journalof Political Economy,
nrerna- Vol.77. No.I (JanuaryfFebruary. 1969). pp. 122—129.
•Part 11, The broader definition of intermediation has interesting implications for the domestic
Deficits economy. In particular. it would suggest that corporations may be regarded as inter-
Inter- mediaries between real assets and financial assets.I am indebted to Raymond Gold-
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there would appear to be no reason why the financial outflows and in-
flows associated with IFI would have to be equal. To simplify the
analysis, I shall assume that such financial flows are equal. This as-
sumption is implicit in much of the discussion about IF!.
Financial intermediation is a type of financial innovation. Such
innovations may be in direct, as well as indirect, finance. Necessary
conditions giving rise to domestic financial innovations include the
existence of finance costs facing borrowers and lenders. The finance
costs are essentially twofold in nature: both transaction costs and un-
certainty facing savers and investors (together with the assumption of
risk aversion).
Financial innovations—direct or indirect—serve to reduce the
finance costs of savers and investors, thereby bringing about a greater
volume of saving and investment (on the assumption that both saving
and investment are interest-elastic to some extent). Financial inter-
mediaries are in a unique position to reduce these finance costs. The
large size and diversity of their assets enables them to pool the real
risk of savers; and the large size and diversity of the securities they
issue enables them to pool the risk of illiquidity facing the savers.6
For lFl to take place, an additional factor must be added to the
conditions stated above: differences in spreads as between liquid and
illiquid assets in two countries or regions. Needless to say, there are
infinite degrees of liquidity or illiquidity of an asset. Thus, the dif-
ference in spreads would have to refer to those found between assets
of comparable liquidity.7
One important qualification of this point regarding the difference in
interest-rate spreads should be mentioned—namely, that the costs en-
tailed in IFI by the United States would have to be as great as they
are domestically within the United States. If this were not the case,
then IFI could take place even if spreads were identical. There does
not appear to be any a priori reason why such a difference in costs
would exist. It is, however, possible that differences in governmental
Thesepoints are covered more fully in Joseph M. Burns, "On the Effects of Fi-
nancial Innovations," Quarter/v Reiieii of Eonoiuics Business, Vol.II.No. 2
(Summer, 1971), pp. 83—95.
If both the long-term and short-term assets in one country differed in liquidity from
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regulationsmight enable financial intermediation to be carried out in a
more efficient manner internationally by the United States than within
our own country. If this were the case, then the qualification raised
would be relevant.
The differences in spreads, as Salant suggests, may be attributed
to a difference in either liquidity preference or the efficiency of
finance—direct or indirect—between the two countries or regions. The
difference in the efficiency of finance may, in turn, be attributed to a
difference in either the market structure of the finance industry in the
two countries (regions) or the efficiency of a given market structure.
The empirical distinction between these latter cases is extremely diffi-
cult, owing to the problem entailed in separating the operating costs
from the profits of a financial institution.8
There does not appear to be any a priori reason for the existence
of such differences in liquidity preference. In addition, some empirical
evidence appears to cast serious doubt on this explanation of the
existence of IF!.9 This is not to say that such differences may not exist.
In this connection, it is of interest to note that Kindleberger, in his
1965 article, makes no mention as to why such differences should oc-
cur. Yet, these differences were the raisond'être, accordingto Kindle-
berger, of IFI. In the Despres-Kindleberger-Salant article of 1966, the
only reference to why such a difference might exist is a statement that
Europeans have had half a century of wars, inflations, and capital
levies. Of course, in the 1966 article, the authors present two other
explanations of why IF! might take place. In Salant's present article,
again no mention is made of why such differences might exist.
As to differences in financial efficiency—both direct and indirect—
there are strong reasons for believing the American financial struc-
ture to be more efficient than the European one. An appropriate ex-
planation of this difference in financial efficiency would have to go into
the factors affecting financial developments within a country. Suffice
it to say here that financial developments in a country are affected,
Cf. Joseph M. Burns,"An Examinationof the Operating Efficiency of Three Finan-
cialIntermediaries." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Anal vsis. Vol. IV, No. 5
(January, 1970), Pp. 54 1—558.
See Salant's references to Lamfalussy's writings. Also cf. Richard N. Cooper, The
Economics of Interdependence:Econo,nic Policy inthe Al/antic Community. New
York, McGraw-Hill, 1968, Chap. V.1
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among other things, by the nature and level of a country's real de-
velopment.'°
In any event, if a difference in interest-rate spreads did exist,
there would be an incentive for IF! to take place. As Salant points out,
once IFI takes place, the difference in interest-rate spreads, when
comparing the two countries, is likely to be reduced—and, in the ex-
treme case, eliminated.
As suggested earlier, foreigners will benefit by the IF! of the
United States via the reduction in the finance costs of both its savers
and investors. In this way, the level of saving and of investment will
be enhanced (on the assumption made earlier about the interest-
elasticity of these two schedules). For this reason, as Salant points out,
the criticism advanced by Halm that IF! is a "monetary veil" is invalid.
As for the United States, we will benefit by earning a return in our
role as international financial intermediator. Costs, however, are also
likely to be present. They will, in fact, be present if the United States
desires to retain its present rate of exchange, and if an increase in the
volume of IF! serves to diminish foreigners' confidence in the ability
of the United States to retain that rate, thereby putting pressure on it.
A corollary of the above point is that costs may well be present if the
United States wishes to retain an independent monetary policy. In ad-
dition, it is interesting to note that if benefits and costs exist for the
United States, a particular amount of IFI will be optimal.
In closing, let me comment very briefly about some implications
of IFI carried out by the United States. First of all, as Salant and
Kindleberger, among others, have suggested, existing definitions of the
balance-of-payments position of a country—including the "liquidity"
and "official-transactions" ones—do not necessarily indicate whether
or not the country is in international-payments equilibrium.'1 A mean-
10See,for example, John 0. Gurley and E. S. Shaw, "The Growth of Debt and Money
in the United States, 1800—1950: A Suggested Interpretation." Revien'of Economics
and Statistics, XXXIX(August, 1957),pp.250—262;JohnG, Gurley,"FináncialStruc-
tures in Developing Economies," in D. Krivine, ed., Fiscaland Monetan' Problems in
Dei'eloping Slates. New York,Praeger, 1967; and Richard N. Cooper, TheEconomics
of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community. TheAtlantic Policy
Studies. New York, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1968, Chap. V.
Cf. C. P. Kindleberger, "Measuring Equilibrium in the Balance of Payments."
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ingful criterionof the international-payments position of the United
States would appear to be the existence and magnitude of pressure on
the exchange rate of the United States dollar.
Secondly, the degree of confidence in the dollar would not neces-
sarily be related solely to the ratio of international reserves of the
United States toits liquid liabilities to all foreigners or to official
foreigners)2 Indeed, for a given degree of confidence, this ratio might
be expected to diminish, the larger the size of the liquid liabilities—as
well as the longer the time period in which the United States maintains
the international value of its currency. The first expectation is based on
an application of the law of large numbers (as well as an implicit as-
sumption regarding the average size of liability); the second expecta-
tion, on the assumption that a learning process about the liquidity of
the dollar would enhance foreigners' confidence in it.
FRANCOMODIGLIANI
MASSACHUSETTSINSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Walter Salant has provided us with a useful and stimulating re-
view of the controversy that has been generated by certain views ad-
vocated by Despres, Kindleberger, and himself, which he labels the
hypothesis of InternationalFinancialIntermediation (IFI). This
hypothesis has been given a variety of interpretations, and Salant him-
self is concerned with several, though it is not always altogether clear
which particular interpretation is being defended at any one point.
One interpretation suggested by the title is that the IFI hypothesis
consists of the proposition that "IF I behavior" by a country can ex-
plain its exhibiting an enduring deficit in its balance of payments. In
this connection, "IFI behavior" is defined in SectionIas the simul-
taneous expansion of a country's foreign assets and of its liabilities to
foreigners. Initially, only financial assets are explicitly included in this
definition, but, at a later point, it is suggested that tangible assets (direct
Cf.BenjaminKlein, "The CompetitiveSupply of Money." Journal of
Credit. dud8au,kiu,_', forthcoming.'I
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• investment) should be included too. Furthermore, a balance-of-pay-
ments deficit is defined as either a "liquidity" or an "official-settlement"
deficit. As long as we confine ourselves to the liquidity definition, I
• cannot see how anyone could seriously argue against this very broad
• interpretation of the IFI hypothesis, for it strikes me as little more
• than a tautology. Clearly, the simultaneous expansions of assets and
liabilities will account for an expansion of liabilities and can account, in
particular, for an expansion of liquid liabilities, or a liquidity deficit.
Since it is an undisputed fact that the United States did exhibit IFI be-
havior in the relevant period, it is hardly surprising that Salant should
conclude again and again that no argument set forth by the critics could
reject this interpretation of the IF! hypothesis as applied to the United
States. However, the criticism was actually concerned with other inter-
pretations, some of which are reviewed below.
One such interpretation construes the essence of theIFI
hypothesis as postulating that the IF! behavior of the United States
reflects intermediation, in the narrower sense of intervening between
primary lender and final borrowers of foreign countries, either directly
through specialized institutions or indirectly through the operation of
markets. This is a substantive hypothesis, for the observed IF! be-
havior could have occurred without strict intermediation, as Salant
acknowledges at the beginning of his discussion of "Alternative
Theories of Enduring Deficits" in Section 2. Indeed, with the dollar
used both as a measure and a medium of exchange in international
• transactions, one might expect that an expansion of trade would lead
foreign transactors to increase the stock of short-term dollar claims.
Since the United States was also a net exporter of capital, it follows
that both its assets and liabilities might have been expected to rise in
• any event. In fact, one might expect that many other developed coun-
tries would, on balance, also exhibit IF! behavior. Hence, whether
• the IF! behavior of the United States reflected to a significant extent
strict intermediations, because of differences in liquidity preferences
• or because of the greater efficiency of its financial institutions, is an
interesting empirical question. Unfortunately, after an extensive exam-
ination of the arguments and the available facts, Salant has to admit
that the evidence is so far inadequate for a reliable answer, and I can
• only associate myself with this conclusion.
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A third and much bolder interpretation, which the authors them-
selves have felt it appropriate to qualify, is that for an IFI country,
and for the United States in particular, an enduring deficit does not
imply any real imbalance but is instead a healthy symptom of growth
and hence should not be a source of concern. In my view, while this
position is substantially valid—at least as a first approximation—in the
case of a conventional financial intermediary, there are some real pit-
falls in extending it by analogy to an IF! country and to the United
States in particular. The point is that a conventional financial inter-
mediary (with appropriate qualification for the central bank and, to
some extent, the banking system) can expand its assets only within
limits set by the need of finding willing holders of its liabilities. As long
as it can find such holders, there may well be little ground for concern
regarding the rate at which its liabilities expand. But these limits do
not apply to the United States, since an increase in its liabilities to
foreigners in excess of what the foreign private sector would wish to
hold must, at least in the first instance, be absorbed by the central bank
in order to maintain the fixed parity. Accordingly, the analogy with
financial intermediaries and the implication that one need not be con-
cerned with the rate of increase in liabilities has some validity as long
as the increased liabilities are willingly held by private foreign holders,
i.e., as long as there is nodeficit ontheofficial-settlements basis. It
follows that the size of the deficit on the liquidity basis may not per se
be worthy of much attention. This is an implication of the lFl hypoth-
esis on which Despres-Kindleberger-Salant have justifiably laid great
stress, though it must be recognized that many others reached the same
conclusion without recourse to the IF! hypothesis. This view is, by
now, largely accepted for the United States, while other countries have
long relied on a different definition of deficit—typically, the basic
balance, which involves the increase in net rather than gross, short-
term liabilities.
But, for the reasons put forward above, the conclusion that in
employing an analogy with conventional financial intermediation, one
need not be concerned with the rate of growth of liabilities or the size
of the deficit, loses much of its validity when it comes to the official-
settlements deficit. This does not mean that any continuing deficit on
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disturbancesthat need to be corrected. Such a deficit does mean that
the strength of the dollar on foreign-exchange markets is being main-
tained through central-bank intervention, and in this sense, it might be
taken as prima facie indication of difficulties; however, for a variety of
reasons, it is not conclusive evidence.
On the one hand, some expansion of dollar reserves by foreign
central banks may be appropriate, depending on the nature of prevail-
ing arrangements with respect to reserve assets and their growth. On
the other hand, one cannot safely infer that the deficit is of a bearable
size from the mere fact that the foreign central banks are absorbing
these deficits in their dollar reserves, when this result is achieved
through the exercise of a variety of pressures (so-called unwilling hold-
ing). Again, the official-settlements deficit may hide the extent to which
the dollar is being supported by central-bank operations, owing to the
practice of some foreign central banks of reducing their direct holdings
of dollar assets reserves by lending them to their commercial banks,
which, in turn, hold dollar assets. Since these are recorded as private
holdings, they do not appear in the official-settlements deficit. Last but
not least, a strong current showing on an official-settlements basis,
while it is an indication of current strength, may not necessarily imply a
healthy state of affairs if, as in recent times, it results from a large
volume of short-term borrowing and volatile foreign financial invest-
ments, accompanied by a weak current account.
Nonetheless, all of the above qualifications do not change the basic
conclusion that, beyond some point, a deficit on an official-settlements
basis will become excessive, a conclusion with which Salant would
presumably not disagree, as is apparent from his final remarks. Unfor-
tunately, it also is clear from these remarks that the IFI hypothesis,
however interpreted, cannot be of much help in identifying just where
that border line lies.